

Power at every point, to mount upon it. True Anti-Slavery men, it strikes us cannot and will not consent to act with any party who will make this question subordinate to any other. Our Governor, in a speech in the Capitol, on the 22d instant, declared, "this will be the question in 1856, and that we should elect some but not national men to office. He is national to excess. He denounces Know Nothingism more bitterly than I would, and yet is a Know Nothing in fact. He knows no North, no South, &c., and the speeches he makes North, he would not fear to make South. This constitutes nationality. And what does all this mean? Simply that Freedom and Slavery are mere matters of taste, have "equal rights," and ought to be equally respected and provided for; or that Slavery is "national." Here is "Non-interference" and Slavery Propagandism.

Now, sir, we want a "party of Freedom," bold and true, who are ready to meet this question in its own position, and drive back the army of the South, with their "Old Line," "Silver Gray," and Know Nothing allies of the North. Let us have a battle between the two parties. Let us have the great antagonisms in this Government, and let it be understood that "he that is not for us is against us." There will be no side or subordinate issues in the South; let there be none in the North. And as bills in legislation are generally committed to their friends, so let the lead in this movement be taken by the men who regard the Slavery Question as the question of the day. We want a Convention, early, to harmonize the Anti-Slavery movement in the different States. Our State will have to be lifted up, several steps, before she will be on an equal platform with the others. We may not be able to stand it up, for the heads of many seem to swim, standing upon it now, low as it is. A reorganization of the Free Soil party will likely take place in this State.

ST. W. BRYCE.

MASSACHUSETTS, FEB. 19, 1855.

You will learn by the papers that the city of New Bedford, in their municipal election last Monday, have elected their Know Nothing candidate for Mayor, over the present Mayor, Rodd, a French, an avowed and avowed Know Nothing. So you see what we expect from that section.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

THURSDAY, MARCH 29, 1855.

As we do not intend to suffer the Era to be run down by proscriptors, but to maintain in vigorous life, the only Press which, at the Capital of the Nation, on slavery, advocates the principles of Freedom, we have addressed a private circular to many of our subscribers who have shown an earnest disposition to sustain it, explaining to them the extent of the defection occasioned by Know Nothingism, and the amount of subscribers required to replace those lost. May we not expect a generous response?

Again we call attention to the Prospect of Facts for the People. Send in subscriptions. We shall get out the first number immediately, and send copies of it to our voluntary agents, to be used in raising clubs.

FACTS FOR THE PEOPLE.

NEVER GIVE UP!

Since we suspended this paper, last year, we have had several calls for it, and for such documents as it would have contained. We have therefore concluded to resume its publication, changing its form to royal octavo, the size and form of Congressional documents, so that it may be bound into a neat, convenient volume.

The last volume was devoted chiefly to a compilation of old Southern documents on the Question of Slavery, and was useful for reference, and for general reading. The new volume will be modified, so as to embrace matter, specially adapted to the present condition of our cause, and yet worthy of preservation.

The Anti-Slavery Movement will be its leading idea.

Such a publication, cheap, convenient, and suitable for extensive circulation and distribution, is particularly needed at the present time, when old party organizations are shattered, and when the Anti-Slavery Sentiment, although pervading the public mind, needs a well-defined, general organ, and a clear, rational method, to secure it its right weight at the ballot box and in legislation. To quicken this sentiment, and to aid in giving it a form and method adapted to the exigency, will be the two-fold object of FACTS FOR THE PEOPLE.

"FACTS FOR THE PEOPLE" will be issued the first week of every month, in royal octavo form, 16 pages, composed chiefly of such papers from the National Era as shall be peculiarly suitable for general distribution. It will be sent only in clubs, at the following rates per annum, twelve numbers constituting a volume:

Six copies to one address - \$1.00

Forty copies to one address - \$6.00

Fifty copies to one address - \$8.00

The postage is a trifle—only half a cent a number, or six cents a year, paid in advance at the office where the paper is received.

Any person or club, by raising \$6, may in this way furnish monthly Anti-Slavery reading for a whole year, to half a hundred persons; and is not this very time to indurate the masses, who have been cut loose from old organizations, with Anti-Slavery principles? Every individual has his field of labor. A good plan would be for a few persons, earnest in the cause, to unite, agree upon an efficient plan for supplying their towns, districts, or counties, and then send in their orders accordingly.

What say our friends? Will they take hold of the project, and make it go? Can they think of any cheaper, easier, and more effective plan of operations just now?

As we intend to begin the 1st day of May next, so that there will be but one month for canvassing, we trust all interested in the matter will see the necessity of prompt action.

THE NEW POSTAGE LAW—DO NOT FORGET.

The new postage law, which requires the prepayment of postage in all cases, goes into operation on the 1st of April. After that date, all letters on which the postage is not paid will remain in the office where deposited, and will be sent to the dead letter office after the usual delay.

KANSAS.—The election in Kansas will take place on Friday, 30th of the month. Gov. Reeder has just issued his proclamation. The most important points are as follows:

A voter must dwell here at the time of offering his vote. He must then have commenced an actual inhabitation, which he actually intends to continue permanently; and he must have made the Territory his dwelling, to the exclusion of any other local habitation. In case any election is contested, the parties to be tried, are the matter before the Governor, who shall determine the case between the parties contesting.

The Missourians are dissatisfied with the proclamation, saying that if the Governor makes himself legislator, judge, and executor.

The notorious frauds practiced at the last State election by the pro-slavery forces, and the border counties of Missouri, has aroused the friends of Freedom in Kansas, and a strong effort will be made to elect a Legislature in favor of making Kansas a free State. The census shows that the population of Kansas is not so great as the vote represented to have been received by Gen. Whitfield for Delegate to Congress. Our Kansas correspondence represents that the Missourians are pouring into Kansas again, preparatory to the next election, but with no view of remaining in the Territory. The tools of the Missouri slave oligarchy will find the next Congress composed of altogether different materials from the last Congress. Gov. Reeder is also determined in protecting the border slave citizens of Kansas in their rights, will come from what act of the country they may.

## CUBAN ANNEXATION—THE ADMINISTRATION, AND MR. SOULE'S MISSION TO SPAIN—THE OSTEND CONFERENCE.

AN ANALYSIS AND A RESUME.

We intend to present, at one view, an analysis and a resume of the correspondence just published, relating to Cuban annexation, Mr. Soule's mission, and the Ostend Conference—some of the most voluminous and complicated, that few, or even those having access to the thoroughness and care requisite to a proper understanding of it. And yet it is one of the most curious, instructive, and important documents ever submitted to Congress; and we entreat our readers to make themselves masters of the analysis which we have taken the trouble to prepare for their benefit. It is long, but it could not be more condensed, without doing injustice to the subject.

As to the printed correspondence between Mr. Perry, Secretary of Legation, and Mr. Marcy, during the absence of Mr. Soule, touching the proposal of a joint commission for the settlement of the mutual claims of both countries, a proposition declined by our Government, there is nothing in it deserving extended notice. Some newspapers, not appreciating the really important character of the general correspondence, have run off into insignificant side issues, instead of fastening public attention on the criminal conduct of the Administration, and the grave responsibilities it assumed.

Mr. Soule was appointed Minister to Madrid in the spring of 1854, received his instructions from Mr. Marcy, July 17th, of the same year, and resigned his commission December 17th, 1854, with the request to be relieved from duty by the end of the following month.

He had been appointed Minister, in one prominent object, the acquisition of Cuba. This was not formally written down in his instructions, but they all relate to this object, and Mr. Soule himself assumes that it was his mission—that to which he was appointed. For example, acknowledging the despatches of Mr. Marcy, recommending him to confer with the American Ministers at Paris and London, he remarks:

"I have been informed of the course which it was the wish of the President I should pursue in the acquisition of the best mode through which could be accomplished the main object of my mission, viz: the acquisition of the island of Cuba from Spain."

This mission, the instructions under which it was commenced, the manner in which it was prosecuted by the Minister, the obstacles which he encountered, the co-operation of Messrs. Buchanan and Mason, the participation of the Administration, and the utter failure of all, constitute the topics of one of the most remarkable executive communications ever laid before Congress.

Before examining this document, one or two preliminary questions demand attention. How happens it that a single man, chosen by the People of the United States to execute the laws for four years, should undertake, on his own responsibility, to accomplish a measure, involving a vast increase of Territory, a large accession of population, of alien races, a sudden and radical change in the relative representative power of the two sections of the Union, a decided preponderance of slave-labor over free-labor interests, and an immense debt, or a wasteful war? Had that measure been made an issue in the canvass which resulted in his election? Did the Convention that put him in nomination, pronounce upon it? Did the Press that supported him, rest his claims upon such policy? Has a majority of the People of the United States, at any time, under any form, expressed an opinion in favor of it? Have we ever had any intimation from Congress, or the Senate, of the expediency of undertaking such a policy? How happens it, then, that the Chief Executive Officer of the People has dared to venture upon a measure of such magnitude, and involving consequences so momentous? But one answer can be given—the Slave Power will it, and its will is the law of this Administration, as it has been of the preceding ones.

We understand, then, the mission of Mr. Soule, and the reason for it.

But, why was he selected as the fit agent?

He had acquired, in his place in the Senate, the idea of purchasing Cuba. Castilian pride, he said, would be revolved. Why, then, send him on a mission to acquire Cuba, when it might become expedient to proffer money? Besides, he had denounced the severity of Mr. Fillmore's proclamation against filibustering, and announced that Cuba, the jewel of the Spanish Crown, must be ours. Was all this calculated to secure him access to the ear and heart of the Spanish Government? Why, then, was he selected? We presume the President must have thought him better qualified by his familiarity with the language of Spain, with the usages of European Courts, with the arts of European diplomacy, to fulfill such a mission, than any native-born American. In fact, the Administration seemed to repose a child-like confidence in the sagacity of the new diplomat, trusting that he might hit upon some method of Cuban acquisition, not yet revealed. The result shows that the President and his advisers are as blundering and unfortunate in foreign as in domestic affairs. Cuba is as far off as never; Spain is disgraced; Mr. Soule is disgraced; Messrs. Mason and Buchanan are disgraced; Young America is disgraced; and the United States stand before the world, in the light of a grasping adventurer, coveting his neighbor's property, but afraid to seize it.

The document before us makes 152 pages; and the majority of readers will better understand its nature and drift, by a general view of its main points, than by reading it in detail.

Mr. Marcy, in his letter of instruction to Mr. Soule, July 23d, 1853, commences by enlarging upon the importance of Cuba; assuming that without such a change of policy as can scarcely be expected, Spain cannot long sustain, unaided, her present connection with the island. The course of the United States, in any contingency calling for their interposition, cannot be precisely defined, as some general positions touching the connection, unless the character be so changed as to affect our present or prospective security. It would resist at every hazard, and the transference of Cuba to any European nation. It would regret exceedingly to see Spain invoking foreign assistance to uphold her rule. Between the protector and possessor of a territory, there is no great difference; where the possessor is weak, and the protector strong, the distinction is annihilated. Assurance is distinctly given, that while Spain shall remain, in fact as well as in name, the sovereign of Cuba, the policy of the United States towards her shall be as it has been; but no such assurance is given, should she resort to the protection of England, or France, or both. The course of the Government of the United States is then vindicated—it has uniformly maintained a good faith towards Spain. But where there is oppression, the sympathies of mankind will be excited; and where the oppressed revolts, sympathizers will aid them. Our Government cannot prevent the withdrawal or emigration of citizens from its jurisdiction, if, while within it, they conform to its laws. Under certain conditions, the United States might be disposed to buy Cuba; but it is scarcely expected that

Spain is now accessible to any proposition of purchase. Separation, whenever it may take place, will be probably "the work of violence." The President therefore does not authorize any proposal to purchase Cuba. Mr. Soule will take care especially to ascertain what arrangements have been made with Great Britain and France to sustain the present dominion of Spain over Cuba, and how far they are urging a change in the internal condition of the island, "particularly in regard to slaves."

Let us solicit the attention of the reader for a moment. The President assumes that Spain will not consent to the purchase of Cuba, and that no convention or arrangement existed with England, for the supply of Cuba with laborers from Africa. Mr. Soule, strangely enough, found, in the very emphasis of his assurance, a ground for believing that the Minister would not be averse to such a policy! He announces also that England has forced the Spanish Government to the admission that all slaves imported into the island since 1821 are to be considered as *libertos*, enfranchised. If this admission be acted upon rigidly, Cuba, he says, has ceased to have a slave; it is lost to Spain, lost to the civilized world, unless it "redeem itself, and shake off the odious yoke." Should it do this, England and France are too much occupied to interfere. Spain would have to fight her alone, and finally either compromise with the Cubans or with us.

July 24th, Mr. Marcy distinctly states, in his despatch to Mr. Buchanan, that the American Government does not complain that England should enforce treaty stipulations in regard to the *encomendados*—but Mr. Soule, in his despatch, regards this enforcement as sufficient reason for surrendering the connection between Spain and Cuba. How distinctly we trace all along the workings of the Slave Interest!

Mr. Soule closes the despatch with an allusion to the French Emperor, who, he imagines, is greatly disturbed at his presence, and who has assigned to Mr. Turgot, French ambassador at Madrid, the task of cutting short "my course here"—a strange hallucination.

January 20th, Mr. Calderon is inflexible—will listen to no project for a commercial convention, or an extension of the powers of our consuls at Havana. Mr. Soule told him frankly that the Government of the United States would "unflinchingly oppose and counteract any and every arrangement by which Spain with France or Spain with England, or with them both, or with the world in arms, should attempt in the slightest degree to render the island an injury or danger to us."

This, of course, embodied the purport of Mr. Marcy's instructions, but in a style not peculiarly well adapted to advance Mr. Soule's mission. Castilian pride, he should suppose, would be as restive under a threat, as a bribe.

February 23d, 1854, Spain is almost in a state of revolution. No party sustains the Government—it exists by compression and tyranny.

Mr. Soule has a conversation with the Count of San Luis, and complains that no friendly relations can be established between Spain and the United States, so long as the State Department is under the control of Calderon. The Count is friendly—a full conversation takes place—it is to be resumed—the State Department, he says, is not the Government. Meantime, everything is in confusion; the Government has exhausted all its resources, and can borrow nothing. Now, should there occur an outbreak in Cuba, and should it become formidable, there would be some chance for an arrangement with a Government so reduced and necessitous. He hints that he should be invested with specific power to meet such a crisis—that is, to buy Cuba, if we understand him.

March 8th, he writes home for instructions in regard to the detention and search of the American schooner *Manchester*.

About this time occurred what is called the Black Warrior outrage, which furnished an occasion for complicating still more the relations of the two countries. The despatches of Mr. Marcy, of the 11th and 17th March, to Mr. Soule, breathe almost a belligerent spirit.

Neither the views of the Government nor the sentiments of the country will brook any evasion or delay, on the part of her Catholic Majesty, in a case of such flagrant wrong. The damages are estimated at \$300,000. This sum is to be demanded; "and it is expected that Spain will be prepared, when you shall present the demand, to apprise this Government of the course it intends to pursue in this matter, and that course will be either a disavowal of the acts of her officials in Cuba, and an immediate tender of satisfaction, or the assumption of the responsibility of upholding their conduct." Delay will be regarded as an aggravation of the injury. It is not to be assumed that "she has not full knowledge of the acts of her subordinate officers at Havana."

A very few days, Mr. Marcy thinks, will be sufficient to obtain a reply. Accompanying the despatches were voluminous statements, the containing testimony in the case, *ex parte* of course, being exclusively from the parties on whom the alleged outrage was committed.

Notwithstanding the urgency of Mr. Marcy's tone, he could hardly expect that the Spanish Government would act in the matter, until it had obtained the statements of the other parties, so that, having the whole case before it, a proper decision might be arrived at.

Mr. Soule, however, seemed to understand the Secretary literally. The demand must be made—Spain must act at once, at once upon *ex parte* statement, and accede precisely to the whole demand. On the 7th of April, he received the despatches—on the 8th, had an interview with Mr. Calderon, with whom he left the voluminous documents, message of the President, &c., and on the 11th, not receiving a reply, addressed a note to the Spanish Government, fixing the time of forty-eight hours for its reply.

In his note of the 8th, Mr. Soule did not exceed in a single point his instructions; but in his letter to the Secretary, he makes the complaint, that no reply had yet been received, he not only transgressed instructions, but placed the United States in a position from which they could be extricated only by retreat or war.

"I must therefore insist," says Mr. Soule, "that those who have been wronged receive an indemnity equal to their losses, namely, three hundred thousand dollars, and that all persons who have, in any responsible manner, been concerned in the perpetration of the wrong, be dismissed from Mr. Marcy's service in the office which they now hold."

This demand was unauthorized by his instructions, which went no further than to require "a disavowal of the acts of her officials, or that her Catholic Majesty 'visit her displeasure upon the Cuban officials who have perpetrated the wrong.' There were many ways of visiting her displeasure, but Mr. Marcy dictated a specific form. Mr. Soule assumed the right to prescribe the precise form, *dismissal from office!* And then going still further, he adds:

"The non-compliance with these just demands within forty-eight hours after the delivery of this communication into the hands of your Excellency, will be considered by the Government of the United States as equivalent to a declaration that her Majesty's Government has determined to uphold the conduct of its officers."

Let justice be done. Mr. Marcy did not expressly authorize such haste, and such an alter-

native. "It is expected," he said, "that Spain will be prepared, when you present the demand, (for indemnity and reparation,) to apprise this Government of the course she intends to pursue in this matter—and that course will be either a disavowal of the acts of her officials in Cuba, and an immediate tender of satisfaction, or the assumption of the responsibility of upholding their conduct."

Mr. Soule, going beyond this, says to the Spanish Government, pay this indemnity—\$300,000—dismiss the Cuban officials from office—comply with these just demands in forty-eight hours after you have heard them, or you will be held as having determined to uphold the conduct of those officers.

It is needless to say that no Government, deserving the name, would submit to such dictation as this. Spain would have merited contempt had she not promptly rebuked the intemperance.

On the 12th, Mr. Calderon, in a note to Mr. Soule, refers to the great mass of documents concerning the case laid before him, the difficulty of translating them, and the fact, that the day which followed their delivery was Sunday, and remarks that his reply, considering all this, is not only without delay, but with promptness. "Whenever," he says, "the Government shall have before it the authentic and complete data, which it lacks at present, it will complete to her Majesty a resolution conformable to justice. The demand for an immediate decision, on an *ex parte* statement, does not reveal a conciliatory disposition, and compliance with it would be incompatible with the dignity of a nation which respects itself, and involve an inexcusable act of arbitrariness and injustice." He proceeds to assure Mr. Soule of the friendly disposition of the Government, and its determination to act promptly, so soon as it shall have the testimony of both parties, and closes with a dignified notice of the peremptory style in which the American Minister had seen proper to demand redress:

"Permit me, in conclusion, to impress on the mind of your Excellency, that the Government of the United States, jealous also of its decorum, is not accustomed to the harsh and imperious manner with which it has been pressed; which, furthermore, is not the mode of proceeding for attaining the amicable settlement which is wished for."

No right-minded man can fail to see, how completely the Government of the United States, by the hasty and excited action of its Representative, is put at disadvantage in a case in which it has clearly the right on its side.

April 13th, Mr. Soule replies in a heated tone, closing what he has to say on "so ungracious a subject," with the expression of a "hope that her Catholic Majesty's Government may, before it is too late, come to more conciliatory resolves." In the same note, he speaks of the records of the legation, as well as those of her Majesty's Department of State, being loaded with reclamations, bearing on grievances the most flagrant, which have never been earnestly attended to, &c. This gave rise to a correspondence between the two functionaries, in relation to these grievances, which were particularized by Mr. Soule, and discussed at length by Mr. Calderon.

May 7th, the Prime Minister writes to Mr. Soule, that the statements expected from Havana had just been received, and would be carefully considered by her Majesty's Government. He assures him that no insult was offered to the American flag, and that, as the preliminary matter had been settled with the proprietors of the Black Warrior, there is no longer a valid claim for indemnity. The letter having been transmitted to Mr. Marcy, he wrote a long and very able reply, dated June 23d, bringing to light facts overlooked by Mr. Calderon, and exposing the fallacy of his argument. Of this we shall have something further to say.

Meantime, Mr. Marcy did not dream of the state of negotiations at Madrid. He must have supposed that his instructions would have been carried out in such a way as not to alienate the Spanish Government, while convincing it that the United States were in earnest. For, on the 24th of April, only about two weeks after he had sent off the despatches relating to the Black Warrior affair, he wrote to Mr. Soule, inviting him, by order of the President, to visit the purchase of Cuba! How utterly he must have misunderstood the relations of Mr. Soule to the Spanish Government! Mr. Marcy states that the reasons for this step are, "the unsettled condition of public affairs in Spain," and "the troubles which may arise in the island of Cuba, from the experience of supplying to introduce a new system of supplying the demand for agricultural labor—in plain words, from the supposed attempt to introduce free labor into the colony. What watchful guardianship over the interests of Slavery!"

Mr. Marcy, with a simplicity quite refreshing in so shrewd a diplomatist, remarks, that the "enlightened statesmen of Spain must see that the period for dissolving the connection between Cuba and the Home Government has passed. Hence, the natural connection of Cuba is with the United States—under our system of government, such a connection would secure to the people of that island the benefits of our political institutions, &c., &c. To be sure, he apprehends there may be some difficulty in inducing the Spanish rulers to take this view, but "the President indulges the hope that you (Mr. Soule) will succeed in presenting the matter so strongly to these rulers as to overcome the national prejudices!" Undoubtedly, Mr. Soule had the gift of presenting matter strongly, but, unfortunately, in just such a way as to arouse and inflame "national prejudices."

The burden of this despatch, from beginning to end, is the acquisition of Cuba; and from the prominence assigned to the subject of the sale of slaves for free, it is evident that this is the object which makes the President so anxious. If the plan "should be gone into extensively," says Mr. Marcy, "and carried out in good faith, it will inevitably Africanize the island." If such be really intended by Spain, the sooner it is known here to be settled policy, the better for all concerned. At all events, if circumstances be favorable, "you are directed by the President to renew the attempt to purchase that island!"

These despatches must have reached Mr. Soule soon after his breach with the Spanish Government. How auspicious the moment, for urging upon that Government to give up its riches! West India possession to the United States! Behold the wisdom that pervades our foreign diplomacy!

Mr. Soule, May 24, acknowledging the receipt of the despatch, writes that, although everything looks hopeless now, he thinks he will yet have the very best opportunity for "bringing the question to a fair test." He complains of the indifference of the Spanish Government to our grievances; and yet that Government was busily engaged in examining every one of these very grievances, and presenting an elaborate view of them to the United States. He charges that the slowness of Congress to take up and act upon the recommendations of the President, makes the extraordinary powers to enforce our just demands, as embodied in the Spanish Government, to resist us. Let Spain, he says, "receive a good lesson this time, and be sure she will wake up from her slumber."

May 24th, in reference to certain warlike demonstrations on the part of Spain, he says there is nothing serious in them. She is without means and credit. She has no fear that the policy suggested by the President will be carried out, and "hence her resistance to our just demands." He is anxious to know what Congress will do; he could not think of retaining a post where he must "behold the contemptuous insolence" which his discomfiture and that of the Administration would be sure to produce.

June 10th, he writes, that the newspapers in Spain delight in disparaging our Government, and praising their own. Of course, this is a patriotic usage in most countries. He is tortured with anxiety about the relations between the two countries, and the part he is supposed to have had in "bringing them to a crisis." He is anxious to know whether the intimations in American newspapers, of dissatisfaction on the part of the Cabinet, be well founded.

June 19th, he refers to a letter of Mr. Marcy, of the 24th ult., and is concerned to find in it not the least intimation of the light in which is viewed by the Cabinet the course I had to pursue, under your guidance, in the Black Warrior affair." This letter of the Secretary does not appear in the correspondence transmitted to Congress. Mr. Soule proceeds to complain of his doubtful position; of the impression beginning to prevail that he has transgressed his instructions; and that the difficulty is to be adjusted by disavowing his acts. He demands light upon the subject. Again he alludes to the hesitations of Congress to meet the President on his high ground, which "has surely been injurious to our reputation for character."

June 24th, he writes, that the President's proclamation against the filibusters "is considered by many a disingenuous mode of masking designs which they suppose it was a scandal to lay bare to the gaze of the world; and that the rumored appointment of commissioners is viewed as an act of condescension, and as involving his resignation. It suggests to him the idea of his being another Walter Raleigh, sacrificed to the vindictive exigencies of a haughty *camarilla*, for having offended its pride, while acting by the express orders and under the commission of his Government."

We do not wonder at the anxiety or apprehension of Mr. Soule. That he had transgressed his instructions is plain; that he had precipitated a crisis, which Mr. Marcy only intended to prepare, is undeniable; but he believed he was acting only in harmony with the spirit of his instructions, that the Administration intended belligerent measures, and he conducted himself accordingly. Nor was he mistaken. Mr. Marcy explicitly says, in his despatch of March 17th, "that the outrage (in the Black Warrior case) is of such a marked character that this Government would be justified in demanding immediate satisfaction of the wrong done at the Havana, and in case of their refusal, in taking redress into its own hands." Accompanying the despatch was the copy of a message from the President to Congress, laying before it the particulars of the outrage, expressing little hope that satisfaction would be made; announcing his purpose, should it be refused, "to use the authority and means which Congress may grant to insure the observance of our just rights, to obtain redress for injuries received, and to vindicate the honor of our flag." In anticipation of such a contingency, he recommends to Congress to adopt such provisional measures as the exigency may seem to demand. Among these measures, we recollect, was the placing at his disposal some millions of dollars. Now, all this meant, the outrage would have justified us in taking redress into our own hands—we will, however, make an appeal to Spain—if satisfaction be refused, we will satisfy ourselves—invest me, then, with the requisite power. This was the language of the Administration—and, judging from the severity of Congress in the Nebraska matter, it confidently calculated upon a favorable response to its suggestions.

Mr. Soule, more modest in his confidence, in the letter of his instructions, and sympathizing with the Administration in its confidence, forgot the necessary caution of a diplomatist, and put himself in a position where, if Congress failed to meet the expectations of the President, his acts must be practically disavowed, or the Administration go to war on its own responsibility. While, therefore, we blame the hot haste of Mr. Soule, let us not forget that the President and his counselors were still more blameworthy, in so eagerly availing themselves of an occasion to quarrel with Spain, and wrest Cuba from her grasp.

The refusal of Congress to "meet the President on his high ground," saved the country from war, and the President and his Secretary found it necessary to save themselves, even at the cost of virtually sacrificing their too willing minister.

Mr. Marcy was obliged to submit to the delays of negotiation, and to seek by the pen, what it had been hoped the sword might command. Hence, the despatch already alluded to, of the 24th June, able, argumentative, and conclusive, but breathing no longer threatening and slaughter. The style of the letter is creditable to his statesmanship, and the closing paragraph shows how completely the President had changed his mode of procedure:

"The President is unwilling to resort to any extreme measures to bring about a better state of things in respect to the island of Cuba, and has therefore determined to make a solemn, and he hopes a permanent, appeal to Spain, for the purpose of adjusting all questions which may embarrass our relations with her, and to make, if practicable, such arrangements for the future, as will give an enduring character of permanence and friendliness to these relations."

After this evidently moderate declaration, we are not surprised at his announcing to Mr. Soule—"The President does not, therefore, expect you will at present take any further steps in relation to the outrage in the case of the Black Warrior."

Accompanying this long letter, is another, dated 4th June, intended only for the eye of Mr. Soule. In this, after stating that the President will not recommend a resort to extreme measures, till milder means are exhausted, he adds:

"Satisfied with the spirited manner in which you have performed the duties of your mission, in his opinion it would give weight, and perhaps efficacy, to the final appeal he purposes to make, if he should associate with you, in presenting and enforcing it, two other of our most distinguished citizens." To carry out such a purpose, the consent of Congress, he says, will of course be necessary.

It strikes us that the object of the whole manoeuvre is, to relieve the Administration of the burden of Mr. Soule's diplomacy without formally disavowing it, and at the same time avoid the hazards of another premature crisis.

As to the letter in reply to Mr. Calderon, the President "desires that her Catholic Majesty's Government should know in what light he views its reply to our claim for reparation. You are therefore at liberty to read the accompanying despatch to the Spanish Minister of Foreign Relations, and may furnish him a copy, if he desires it."

These despatches were duly received by Mr. Soule, but the letter referred to, was not read

to the Spanish Minister, for reasons which we shall examine presently.

Our representative seemed unable to see any chance of an amiable settlement of difficulties, and put the most unfavorable construction upon every word and act of the Spanish Government. In July, the *guasi* revolution took place—the old Ministry was overthrown—Mr. Pacheco took the place of Mr. Calderon. Pezuela, Captain General of Cuba, was dismissed, the Spanish Ministry, however, expressing itself satisfied with the zeal and loyalty with which he had discharged his duties. General Concha was appointed in his place—a man not popular with filibusters. Mr. Soule chose to regard both acts as unfriendly to the United States, and, in an interview with Mr. Pacheco, remarked that the terms in which Pezuela was dismissed, "took away from her Majesty's Government the means of satisfying one of the main exigencies arising out of the grievances which had so seriously disturbed its relations with the United States"—and that the appointment of Concha could not fail "to awake deep remembrances, and to wake up emotions which, for the peace and harmony of the two countries, it had been better to leave dormant."

Mr. Pacheco gave him "the most solemn assurances that no offence could have been committed, as the officers were prepared without any reference to the existing difficulties between his Government and ours." This was communicated in a despatch, August 19, but not a word is said of the presentation of Mr. Marcy's argument, of June 22d, in reply to Mr. Calderon.

August 30th, he speaks of the "most restless anxiety" of the Prime Minister, "to get a word of writing from me on the vexed subject," the Black Warrior case. Mr. Soule would not gratify him—he would not submit to him the unanswerable argument of Mr. Marcy—"I deemed it not judicious to indulge him"—why, we shall soon see. In the notes of a conference held with Mr. Pacheco, made by the Secretary of the Legation, and transmitted with the same despatch, it appears that the Prime Minister requested Mr. Soule "to express what he had said in writing, and that he would think it under most serious consideration, and act upon it." He said that the Spanish Government had addressed the subject, and he much regretted to hear that our Government was not satisfied; that her Majesty's Government "was disposed to do everything to prove its friendship and good disposition towards that of the United States; but unless the objections to the communication of Mr. Calderon could be made known in writing, he really did not see what he could be expected to do about it." Mr. Soule all the while had in his possession those very objections in writing, with the President's desire that they should be stated to the Minister, and, if he desired it, that a copy of them be given him! And yet, he withheld them! He simply replied that he could see no necessity to put anything in writing. Meantime, he was about to retire to Aulus, on the frontier, for his health, but, if the Minister at any time should feel that his presence at the capital was desirable, he could telegraph him.

The conduct of Mr. Soule shows that he was intent upon one object, "the main object of his mission," as he styles it, the acquisition of Cuba—that, while this seemed unattainable, no other object deserved consideration—that, in his opinion, however friendly the demonstrations of the Spanish Government, it was in fact better to keep open the questions of controversy with it, with a view of facilitating the accomplishment of the one great object. Mr. Pacheco, the head of the new Ministry, in a note dated September 16th, remarks: "From the moment I was intrusted with the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, I conceived it my duty to examine into all claims pending between Spain and other Powers, in relation to injuries inflicted on private individuals, for the purpose of bringing them to a settlement, if such were possible." This was the spirit which breathed through all the communications of the successive Ministers after the Revolution of July, but Mr. Soule held himself aloof, refused to respond to it, pertinaciously refused, although urgently solicited, to put anything in writing, or to submit to the Spanish Government the objections of Mr. Marcy to the argument of Mr. Calderon, although authorized to do so, and to prepare a copy of them if desired. Speaking of Mr. Pacheco, in his despatch of October 19th, he says he is "incapable of approaching a certain great question" (the transference of Cuba) "with that boldness of purpose which alone could commend it to public favor. I touched him upon it a few days ago, and found that he was not so ready than his predecessor